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fathers. The exquisite climate of Japan may in like manner have occasioned the bright, careless, happy disposition of the Japanese.

But perhaps you are impatient at such discussion about the probable natural origin of different temperaments, and prefer some "old-aunt-of-the-universe" theory by which every people simply has its inborn character given to it from time to time, and that's all. Yet I will say, the fact that these and kindred speculations have excited acrimonious pietistic opposition and frequent accusation of gross materialism is remarkable, considering that in reality they not only lead to the finest spiritual views and create new incentives and guides to the highest morality, but even give grounds for a literal and rational belief in many or all of the principal religious dogmas, which must otherwise be mysteries to the devout and stumbling-blocks or superstitions to skeptics and infidels.

GOESCHEL ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF CARL FRIEDRICH GOESCHEL, BY SUSAN E. BLOW.

CHAPTER III.

On the Triplicity of the Proofs of Immortality in the Light of Speculation.

Casting another backward glance at the path over which we have travelled, we discover that, from the immanent movement of Thought from Being to the Notion and the unfolding of finite Spirit out of Soul into Personality, there falls a light which illuminates and transfigures the three original external proofs of immortality. These proofs rest upon discursive thought, which tries vainly to organize its scattered stores; therefore, in themselves, they bring no conviction of truth. The successive is never the inclusive and penetrative. This discursive Thought first attains organic unity in the immanent development of the Notion; hence it arises that these same proofs, seen in the light of speculative philosophy, really produce Conviction. This speculative light radiates from the elevation of Being (in whose sphere the three

dogmatic proofs darkly struggle) into Thought. This done, the Categories of Being and Essence are transfigured into their Truth contained in the Categories of the Notion.

It is evident to the most superficial observation that the simplicity which is the basis of the metaphysical proof corresponds to the Individuality of the soul whence proceeds its immanent movement; that the capacity for infinite development and the destiny to infinite ends, of which the soul, according to the moral proof, is conscious, corresponds to the consciousness of the subject into which the soul awakes; and that the thought of persistence, which is the basis of the ontological proof, finds its analogy in the Spirit, in whose participative Personality the Soul realizes its notion. It is true that in the first proof consciousness is presupposed, for only from consciousness can simplicity be deduced; it is, however, *only* presupposed, and not developed. In the series of proofs, as in the immanent movement of the notion, this development falls within the second sphere, and consists in that diremption of consciousness wherein self and its other fall apart, and yet both are known as content of consciousness. This is the transition to the third sphere. Thus far the speculative movement of the idea offers nothing new, either in its content or in its successive phases; it places us, however, upon a new standpoint, whence we look at, and into, and through the heretofore scattered and isolated proofs.

Another difference lies in the fact that, whereas each proof in its dogmatic form is exclusive and self-sufficient from the speculative standpoint, it is seen to go over into the succeeding proof. The content of each proof sinks, therefore, into an organic phase of truth, and, if taken alone out of this organic unity, proves nothing. The movement is dialectical; the discovered proof contradicts and annuls itself. In the immediate form in which it is posited it is not true, and in its development it exhibits its own insufficiency. This dialectic must now be more attentively considered, for it is the intrinsic though unrecognized cause of the doubt which the separate proofs have left behind them. The negation involved in the isolated proof is felt, but the positive truth, veiled in the inadequate form, is ignored.

Therefore it becomes our duty to notice how the several conceptions which underlie the dogmatic proofs of immortality are transformed when received in the light of the speculative method

and how the dialectic movement of these proofs brings out their relationship to each other.

The first point to be noted is, that the simplicity of the soul, which is the basis of the first proof, is not able to maintain itself when confronted with the thought to which it nevertheless belongs, and is therefore really negated in the second proof.

Though the soul, being simple, is indivisible, and consequently can neither separate itself from itself nor go out of itself, its essential destiny is to go over into that which is not itself; for, be its end knowledge or activity, each equally necessitates the alienation of the soul from itself.

In the first proof the soul, as simple, is dry and arid; in the second it becomes fluid in its forward movements. In the same manner the content of the second proof is negated in the third, in that therein the diremption into Subject and Object, Thought and Being, is cancelled. The Subject becomes conscious of the Object as well as of itself, whence results the content of the third proof, according to which each is in the other, and to Thought (which is Persistence) is ascribed Being (which is Persistence). Stated differently: According to the first proof the soul persists in itself, and all its movement is from and within itself; yet, according to the second, having become self-conscious, it lives and has its Being in God, and its movement is not from itself, but from God; finally, in the third proof God and the Soul are mediated in the Spirit, and the estrangement between them forever cancelled.

But though in this transition negation has declared itself, there must be recognized simultaneously the positive moment, *i. e.*, the form in which the Content of the negated proofs is still preserved. Thus, the underlying truth of simplicity is revealed in Individuality; for Individuality is that Unity which in its diremption maintains its integrity. Similarly, the implicit truth of destination (*i. e.*, the soul's capacity for and destiny to high ends) becomes explicit in Consciousness, which, knowing both itself and its other, feels itself to be active and passive, subjective and objective. Finally, the presupposed immediate Unity of Thought and Being is mediated in the Personality of the Spirit.

After these general statements we shall venture to dwell freely upon the isolated proofs. Ultimately we shall doubtless find a point toward which our scattered thoughts will converge.

The first crude representation of simplicity is so barren, so unproductive, so unthinkable that no man can persevere in holding it. That the soul, being simple, cannot die we willingly concede, for the simple is dead, and what is dead cannot die. The characteristic of life is self-alienation. The truth of simplicity is therefore the unity of its varied determinations. The unity really underlies the dogmatic conception of simplicity. Wolf defines simplicity as *vis* or primary force. This force, according to him, is the Representative Activity which manifests itself in different faculties (facultates), and, without detriment to its unity, exerts itself in different directions.

Again, when the soul, in virtue of its simplicity, is characterized as immaterial, the first conscious meaning is that the soul is dispossessed of the body and its independence of the body is declared. But without a body the soul cannot exist; the truth is that the soul has its real body in itself, that body and soul are one in the Spirit because both are of the Spirit.

In predicating immateriality of the soul, we therefore really declare only that the soul is not subject to matter. This predication, moreover, is wholly negative; we have neither explained what the soul is, if it is not material, nor have we defined matter itself. When Idealism says, The soul is spirit, *animus est spiritus*, it understands by spirit only that it is not matter. Spirit is the opposite of matter, but the validity of matter is as little contested by Idealism as by Materialism—the difference between the two schools of thought being that Materialism ascribes the sole supremacy to matter, while Idealism confesses a belief in dualism. But in dualism thought can find no rest; moreover, it demands to know what matter is. Thought struggles to free itself from matter; this is the deep internal significance of the conception of immateriality. Thought first contests the *supremacy* of matter, then its *validity*. In the course of this contest it falls upon many different conceptions which are far more than fancies of the imagination.

Matter is the limit temporarily allotted in thought to the finite spirit—therefore darkness is its nature. This more adequate definition of matter has also the great significance that it finds in matter the negation which was ascribed to the soul when the latter was characterized as immaterial. With this definition, in fact, the whole battle is won if its meaning is really apprehended and de-

veloped. The forms of representation will, however, vary until they culminate in the adequate concept.

In the development of this definition, matter is first characterized as the difference between the infinite and finite spirits, for the former includes its limit and the latter does not. This impenetrable limit of the finite spirit is what we call matter.

Again, in the variation of views which have not ripened into insight, matter is defined as the illusory image conjured up by the understanding in lieu of the "thing-in-itself"; this latter it can never find, as it lies beyond the subjective sphere.

Finally, matter is characterized as soul in the process of becoming; this dead soul during its slow self-transfiguration serves the living soul, through whose reaction it is quickened into conscious life.

In all these representations the body is negatively but not positively cancelled. They are forms which, though developed from the presupposed immateriality of the soul, yet seek to rise above the dogmatic dualistic standpoint upon which the conception of immateriality immediately rests. They contest that validity and authority of matter which idealism left unimpeached; they ascribe reality exclusively to the soul, and thus reduce matter to negation. Their inadequacy results from the fact that they apprehend this negation only in its alienation from positive reality.

Ultimately the truth grows clear which is hinted in all these representations. This truth is the monism of the spirit, according to which the spirit is seized, not as the synthesis of body and soul, but as the unity of these two moments. Thus the abstract negative conception of immateriality leads ultimately to the concrete notion of the spirit.

It is a most instructive and noteworthy fact that even those systems of thought which move not from Thought or the Subject, but from Substance or Being, are forced involuntarily to admit this immateriality. Under this head must be classed the well-known proposition of Spinoza in the Ethics: "*Mens humana non potest cum corpore absolute destrui sed ejus aliquid remanet quod aeternum est.*" Under this proposition stands its mathematical demonstration, together with a scholium, according to which indeed the *existentia mentis* ceases with the body, but the *essentia mentis*, as an "*intellectus in Deo conceptus*," persists in God to all eternity.

It must be admitted that with the *existentia mentis* perish *Representation* (*imaginatio*) and *Re-collection* (*recordatio rerum praeteritarum*), both of which are apprehended as dependent upon the body. Consciousness, on the contrary, is somewhat illogically preserved.

This loss of existence and recollection is the logical result of a system which apprehends God as Being or Substance, and therein cedes to Being the supremacy and priority over Thought. With such a presupposition it is forced to concede that the starting-point of the finite spirit is also its goal—to declare that nothing is accomplished by existence in time, and to assert that the soul shall return to God in the same form of *essentia mentis* in which it was originally in God. This is the radical insufficiency of this stage of thought; the consciousness retained in God its radical inconsistency—an inconsistency, however, which is unavoidable, because the spirit, in virtue of its absolute freedom, as often as it is renounced, instinctively asserts anew its own validity. It is worthy of remark that Spinoza seizes Thought as simple because he opposes it to Extension, and that he grasps both Thought and Extension as attributes of substance, whereas the thinking Being and the extended object are, in his view, only modes or affections of these attributes.

When Spinoza attempts to explain the difference between the *esse essentiae* and the *esse existentiae* he involuntarily substitutes Thought for substance as the ground of the *esse essentiae*, but while so doing still holds Thought apart from the subject demanded by and inseparable from Thought. With him, too, existence is externality, or extension and essence, simplicity or thought. The *esse existentiae* to him is *ipsa rerum existentia extra Deum et in se considerata quae tribuitur rebus postquam a Deo creatae sunt*. All finite beings without distinction are therein apprehended as external, *i. e.*, as Things; simultaneously the idea of emanation is substituted for that of creation, the *esse essentia* signifying the thought in God which is eternal, *modus quo res creatae in Deo concipiuntur*. Thus even this original and highest Being of the “*essentia*” falls within the range of Speculative Knowing, which is “*tertium genus cognitionis sub specie aeternitatis*.”

In illustration of the difference between the *esse essentia* and the *esse existentia* Spinoza instances the work of art whose es-

sence is vitally persistent in the mind of the artist, whereas its existence is projected and disjoined from thought, and is thus purely external. In this separation from the creative thought it may easily be destroyed while the essence survives in the imagination of the artist. This illustration ignores the fact that God is thought as the subject who thinks the creature, or, to express it passively, as the subject by whom the creature is thought. From this insight follows the eternity of created personality—that is to say, when the creature is thought by the creator as thinking, the creature must also think, because it is not only thought by God, but, by the Thinker, thought as thinking. For this same reason the creature thinks God, or (expressing it passively to make it more clear) God, the Thinking Being, is reciprocally thought by the creature who is thought as thinking. Thus thought and thinking the creature endures in eternity because it is once and for all thought by God. Moreover, it endures *as* it is thought, viz., as thinking; and it thinks God, *i. e.*, the Eternal Personality God is thought by the creature because it is thought by God. Thus Spinoza's own illustration, logically completed, leads to personal persistence, though, in the view of Spinoza himself, personal persistence, together with all representation and recollection, dissolves in infinite substance.

It would seem that even Dante fears to lose recollection as he plunges his soul into the depths of the glory of God.

“Because in drawing near to its desire
Our intellect engulfs itself so far
That after it the memory cannot go.”

But the great poet of Christianity recovers the memory, both of things human and of things divine, and reproduces for us in the thirty-three Cantos of the “Paradiso” the content of recollection. Lethe blots out only the nugatory, vain, and unreal memory of Sin, while Eunoë, upon the soul's entrance into Paradise, restores to consciousness “all good deeds done,” and renews and vivifies the power of memory. Thereafter, as it advances through the realm of light, the Spirit is increasingly illuminated until, penetrated by the vision of God in the glory of his threefold Being, it knows itself as God's-eternal image.

Returning to the immateriality of the soul, let us say once more that its outcome is the finite spirit, and this finite spirit is the

identity of the soul with its body. The body is immanent in the soul; it is not bestowed upon the soul from without; it is the externalization of the soul, and it has to be *in* the soul in order to come forth out of the soul. Hence it is indestructible. This is the outcome of the metaphysical proof.

It may be said that the soul is its own body, its own organ, and again that its body is itself. The external body of the soul is its *ὕλη*, the internal body its *ὑποκείμενον*. Plato says in the "Phædrus": "The soul resembles the united power of the chariot and of the driver who sits thereon and guides it." The chariot is the inner body of the soul, the driver is the soul of the soul; the union of the two is not to be grasped as a synthesis but as one force, hence as unity.

The soul, as spirit, is consequently indivisibly one with its inward body, *i. e.*, the soul has its individual form though it separate from its outward body, as our eyes see it do. As far as we can trust our eyes, this separation is not to be denied, but we can trust our eyes only in so far as that which transpires in death is visible, *Ὁρᾶται δε οὐδ' αὐτὴ ψυχή*.—(Xenoph. "Memorab.," iv, 3, 14.) Animus autem solus, nec quum adest, nec quum discedit apparet.—Cicero, "De Senect.," c. 22. Visibility is limited, however, to the outward body—hence the soul separates itself from its body only in so far as the body is purely external, only in so far as the body being visible is already different from the soul; or, in other words, only in so far as the body is the other of the soul. Death actualizes what is already ideally contained in the distinction between body and soul. As all nature is the other of soul, so is the body which pertains to nature its other. Death is the consummation of this thought, for death consists only in the soul's separation from its other, that through separation this other may be identified with soul. Upon this identification rests the conception of resurrection; the body which, as external and only external, is deserted by the soul, shall be again united with the soul, or, in other words, its externality shall be dissolved in the soul.

It is not and should not be said that the body leaves the soul, but that the soul leaves the body; *ἡ ψυχή καταλείπει το σῶμα*.—Xenoph. "Cyrop.," viii, 7. Therefore it is in the soul that the body finds itself. This is the resurrection, and its presupposition is the immortality of the soul. Its first phase is that the soul, being

independent of its external body, being indeed its own body, is victorious over death; its second phase is the resurrection and transfiguration of the outward body into reunion with the soul. As Psyche is the soul and Eros the spirit, so the nymph Calypso is the soul, the earthly man Ulysses the body, and the island of Ogygia the earthly dwelling-place. The separation of the lovers is death; death consists in the dissolution of their union, but does not imply that the separated lovers cease to exist. Rather, after the separation, Eros watches and protects, Psyche labors and serves, Calypso waits and weeps, and Ulysses is tossed upon strange seas and wanders through strange lands, just as the body after death is scattered in its atoms and transmuted into varying forms. Reunion is resurrection in the Spirit. Therefore the resurrection is only understood when it is apprehended as the transfiguration and penetration of the body by the soul in the spirit.

The truth of this conception may be more definitely developed from the genetic idea of externality. Externality is nothing else than the isolation and mutual exclusion of the particular moments of the notion, the unity and totality of which is the Spirit. Outward phenomena are thus the dismembered elements of the internal, self-active, and poetic. The body represents the isolated moments of the individual soul, as nature represents the isolated moments of humanity. These moments are, however, still external to the soul. This externality, which is visibility, in death ceases as appearance *for* the soul; the visible is that which is only a fleeting show; death is *for the soul* the dissolution, or rather the transfiguration, of the external. But even after death the realm of appearance endures; *for itself* and for those who remain behind the external body is still external. Its real transformation falls, therefore, in the future, and is conceived as resurrection and glorification of the flesh. Through this resurrection the verification becomes complete of the unity of the soul as spirit with its so-called body, according to the ground and final end of time, and of its distinctness from the body only in so far as the latter is appearance—*i. e.*, semblance which alone has visibility. The external separation of death takes place in the same moment in which the soul as spirit internalizes its body. This internalization is itself the cessation of externality.

In this development of simplicity and of difference the origi-

nally abstract and barren conception of simplicity realizes a rich and pregnant content. The richer any given thought, the less will it at first be comprehended; the fuller its content, the more difficult for it to gain complete self-mastery. Therefore, with minds illuminated by this insight into unity and distinction, it is interesting to look back upon precedent conceptions, and particularly is it delightful to glance into that crystalline mirror of scholastic thought which we inherit from Dante, even though we may not pause adequately to develop its content. In the "Purgatorio," canto xviii, 49, Virgil teaches as follows:

"Every substantial form that segregate
From matter is and with it is united,
Specific power has in itself collected,
Which without act is not perceptible."

Still more definitely Statius ("Purgatorio," xxv, 37-108) develops, in speaking of the creation of the soul (from which later developed Occasionalism and Preformationism), the inseparability of the divine and the human as united in the spirit, and also (Traducianismus Corporis, from which later arose the system of Epigenesis) the separability of the external body until its transfiguration. The generation and birth of each man is an act of divine creation. He who has advanced so far in thought that he finds the dogmatic—*i. e.*, external and sensible demonstration of Statius—inadequate, may ascend through the simile of the mirror into which the argument rises in lines 22-27, and the simile of the shadow with which it culminates in lines 100-108, into that speculative reflection of the external in the internal through which philosophy in these modern days has renewed its youth. This speculative insight consists in the apprehension of what seems to happen externally—*i. e.*, to pass before the observing subject as the inner self-movement of the subject itself, which herein becomes visible to the subject in the object as in a mirror.

"And wouldst thou think how at each tremulous motion
Trembles within a mirror thine own image;
That which seems hard would mellow seem to thee."

Simplicity, Unity, Internality, are different grades of one quality. Language has one word for *εἷν* and *ἐν*.

Herewith the metaphysical or theoretical, which may also be

called the objective, proof realizes more and more its implicit truth; this truth is the moral or practical, more adequately the subjective proof; besides these two proofs there can be but one other which shall include them both. *We*, however, are still occupied with the first proof, which culminates in the immediate unity of the soul and the body. This unity involves the unity of life; there is not *another* life beyond the grave, but it is this life which continues, just as it is this ego which endures and not another. Herewith otherness, both in the individual and external to the individual, is completely cancelled, and thus *personality is realized*, externality dissolved, and limit annulled, both in the positive and negative sense. Thus it happens that each finds place in the other, as Dante too experiences with astonishment ("Purgatorio," ii, 34 *et seq.*), for the one thing necessary is not place, but the unity of space and time, of the body and the soul. Through this *aperçu*, Æneas of Gaza was able to refute the doubt where place could be found for so many millions of souls. "In those dwelling-places of intelligible essences (*i. e.*, of souls) there is no scantiness of room, but a perfect abundance of it, for all are one. Each one fills the entire space and at the same time admits into itself all the others (*i. e.*, interpenetrates each and is interpenetrated by all), and no one excludes any other or in any way impedes it as material bodies are wont to do."—(Æn. Gaza, "Theophrastus.")

According to the metaphysical proof, the soul is further as monad, in itself and through itself, self-active and self-determining; thus it completes itself into a circle. Hence is deduced its imperishability. This self-determination is, however, negated in the moral proof, according to which the soul in its immediacy is determined, and this determination is not through itself. We find the soul, as created, determined *by* God and determined *to* ends; though this prescribed destiny in relation to which the soul is passive is nothing else than that the soul shall actively develop itself. In other words, the soul is determined to be self-determining. The moral proof thus deduces from determination the same result which the metaphysical proof deduced from simplicity, *i. e.*, from the opposite of determination. The solution of this contradiction is as follows: The soul is determined by God, hence has not its ground in itself, yet the soul is self-determining, and de-

rives its essence from no other essence. These seemingly clashing statements contain in reality no contradiction, for God is not an Essence alien to the soul, but the Absolute Spirit, which, as personal or penetrative and self-communicative, creates and preserves the finite spirit, which latter, penetrated and penetrating, manifests itself also as personal. Persistence itself is nothing but continuous creation, whose presupposition is the personality of the absolute spirit and whose result is the personality of the finite spirit. The creature continuously creates its existence and its thought out of the Creator, the spirit out of the Spirit; or, as Spinoza says, "The Creatio Dei demands the Concursus Dei." To this he clearly and truly adds: "Nullam rem creatam suâ naturâ ne momento quidem posse existere, sed continuo a Deo procreari."

The first proof affirms as Aristotle also teaches: *Anima per se vitam habet*. The second affirms as the Greek fathers of the Church particularly taught: *Anima non per se vitam habet, sed percipit ex conjunctione cum spiritu, fonte vitæ æternæ*. Thus, too, the Scriptures teach (1 Tim. vi, 16) that only God has immortality in Himself with Christ, who as one with the Father in the Holy Spirit is Himself the Resurrection and the Life (John xi, 25). Man receives immortality. He that believeth in me, says Christ, though he die yet shall he live, as the branch lives if it abide in the vine, but withers if it is torn from the vine. He who is called to communion with God in Christ can never die, for as personal he participates in the imperishable personality of the Absolute Spirit.

Thus from the creation of God results its progressive continuance as *concursus Dei continuus*. This continuous activity of the Absolute Spirit is the source of the continuous activity and development of the finite Spirit; the activity of the latter is only possible as result of the activity of the former, and is mediated in the notion personality. The unity of the two is the immortality of the soul, the finite spirit progressively developing itself in itself through a constant influx from the everlasting fountain of the divine life and thought. This is the content of the second proof which herewith has taken up the first proof into itself, or rather this is the outcome of the second proof which transcends itself as it consciously unites the content of the first proof with its own.

The first point is that the soul exists, consequently that the soul

is created. Its creation presupposes the intellectus in Deo conceptus, and this demands as consequence the concursus Dei continuus. That is to say: "The thought of God is creation, and the creation of God is eternal." "He spake and it was done," writes the Psalmist, and the Preacher adds: "I know that whatsoever God doeth it shall be forever." The Absolute Spirit thinks the finite spirit, or rather finite spirits (for finitude implies plurality), and this thought is their creation: the Absolute Spirit remembers the hosts of finite spirits who, during the long course of history, have vanished from this earthly scene, and this remembrance is their preservation. God's creation never ceases; He who creates upholds his creation; He preserves each object in the mode corresponding to its nature, maintains each species in its appropriate category, and yet transfigures all the separate moments through organic membership in the totality.

The remembrance and preservation of departed spirits in the Absolute Spirit could not be if these spirits themselves were not. As the thought of God, being itself living, creates life; so the perpetual remembrance of God maintains life. The vital concept of the Absolute is a reciprocal concept, and implies that, inasmuch as God remembers finite spirits, these finite spirits must remember him, and in him remember themselves. The *outward* manifestation of the spirits of men *outwardly* vanishes, but the spirits themselves, upheld and transfigured in the Absolute Spirit, live in the life of God. If, then, the Absolute Life consists in consciousness, all that is maintained in this life must be also conscious. On its external side the history of what has been closes in the graveyard, but history comprehended opens our ears to the cry of the prophet, "O ye dry bones, hear the voice of the Lord!" Resurrected humanity is the actuality, the truth, and the surety of God's throne; without it God would be lifeless isolation. For all who can truly re-think this thought the meaning is this: that the Absolute Idea preserves itself in its actuality, certainty, and truth only in so far as finite spirits are preserved and perfected in their self-consciousness in this absolute life of God. The truth and majesty of God's throne demand the assembling of the children of men for his footstool. He who is sure of God is sure of his own life in God. The certainty of the conviction of immortality tests the depth of insight into the nature of Absolute Spirit.

Such is the ultimate development of the second proof in its transition into the third. This is the profound truth in which Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit" finds its infinite culmination.¹ Because man is created to be spirit he is created to be immortal. "*Hinc clare sequitur*," says Spinoza himself, "*animam immortalem esse*." "Consequently," he adds, "none but God can destroy the soul." This can only mean that God has the physical power to enter into contradiction with his own creation, in which his expressed will is the persistence of the Spirit. This, again, is only saying that God can contradict and retract his own will. Such an ascription of simple physical power to the Godhead is an unthinking and unthinkable contradiction. Most significant is it that this has been recognized by that great thinker who moves from the being of substance in that he claims to recognize the Will of God as natural reason in nature itself. Here, again, the Spirit shows itself under the inadequate presupposition; it is not in nature but in the creation of the human spirit, or in thought itself, that Spinoza reads the Word of God.

"*Leges autem illae naturae sunt Decreta Dei lumine naturali revelata. Decreta deinde Dei immutabilia esse jam demonstravimus. Ex quibus omnibus clare concludimus, Deum suam immutabilem voluntatem circa durationem animarum hominibus non tantum revelatione sed etiam lumine naturali patefecisse.*"

The lumen naturale is in this sense, as creation itself, the first revelation.

"*Nec obstat*," he continues, "*si aliquis objiciat, Deum leges illas naturales aliquando destruere ad efficienda miracula: nam plerique ex prudentioribus Theologis concedunt, Deum nihil contra naturam agere [for Creation is his Will] sed supra naturam, hoc est, ut ego explico, Deum multas etiam leges operandi habere, quas humano intellectui non communicavit, quae si humano intellectui communicatae essent, aequae naturales essent, quam caeterae. Unde liquidissime constat, mentes esse immortales.*"

We have now arrived at a point where we may touch more definitely a question which runs secretly through the whole history of the doctrine of immortality, and which throughout is met

¹ Nothing is more misunderstood in the much misunderstood philosophy than the sublime conclusion of that vast cathedral structure which Hegel built for our age in his "Phenomenology of Spirit."

by an unexpressed answer. This question is whether the immortality of man can be recognized immediately by the light of nature or only in the light of the special divine revelation through the Word of God. We are pointed toward the answer by the second proof of immortality, which goes back to God and reads the Will of God in the nature of the finite spirit. Our whole present explanation is, in fact, nothing more than an answer to the question concerning the source of our knowledge. The first necessity is that we should make the question itself clear to our minds. This done, the answer is ready. The question is whether the immortality of man can be recognized in the creation of man alone. This question contains the presupposition that creation is something once done and finished, and that man once created is emancipated. In other words, creation is conceived as an accomplished fact and not as a continuing process. With such a creation and such a nature—a creation which has ceased to be, and a nature which, having lost its source, has lost its life—not only the demonstration of immortality but immortality itself is impossible. If, however, we apprehend creation as progressively continuous, and in this continuous creation recognize the persistence of the finite spirit, we do not get this knowledge from nature, but from the source of nature—viz., from the Spirit of God, which is progressively revealed in creation. The concept of a progressively continuous creation includes the revelation of the Absolute Spirit in the finite: this *creatio continua* manifests itself as Providence, and after the fall (*i. e.*, the actual abstraction from the continuous creation) as Redemption, which is therefore apprehended as a second creation. A perpetually flowing stream of water is manifestly unthinkable without a perpetual source; the stream may be cut off from its source, but, by as much of flowing water as it contains, it is nevertheless united with it. In the same way, by as much light as remains in fallen man, his reason is united with the Spirit of God and his nature still in relation with its supernatural origin. We must therefore affirm that the personal immortality of man can only be recognized in its participation with the personality of the Absolute Spirit; this participation is recognized only in the progressively continuous creation and revelation of God, and this revelation after man's alienation from God is recognized only in Redemption, God's second act of condescend-

ing grace. Herein is cancelled the confusing difference between an *immortalitas naturâ* taught by the first proof, and the *immortalitas gratiâ* upon which the second proof essentially rests. So far as the natural creation still endures it endures through the continuity of its relationship with God—i. e., through the grace of God.

With this continuous creation and revelation is given the concept of immortality from which the third proof deduces the being of immortality. In the light of speculation, however, it has become clear that the Notion or Thought as Spirit is itself the highest, the eternal and indestructible. It therefore needs not the imputation of Being as something external to itself in order to be. It is merely a proof of the power which natural Being has usurped over the natural man, and herewith over the naturalized reason of Thought. When fettered by sensuous modes of thinking, we still desire something fixed and tangible to which Thought or Consciousness may attach itself. All such sensuous thinking implies that thought in itself is not—that only in the *ἰδέα* can it find its *ὑποκειμενον*, and that it needs matter for its support just as the Hebraic Vocal, which Spinoza compares with the soul, demanded a fulcrum external to itself as its body.

Thought, however, is really so little dependent upon Being that the truth rather is that eternal persistence belongs essentially to and is immanent in Thought. This is the distinctive content of the third proof. Spinoza touches this third proof when he teaches that the idea of persistency as well as that of progressive development, under varying modifications of the form of existence, is immediately necessary to the soul, while the idea of its destruction is wholly alien to and contradictory of its substance. He expresses this proof negatively when he says: *Nullam nos ideam habere, quâ concipiamus substantiam destrui*. To deny to Thought its persistence is nothing more nor less than to deny persistence to the persistent. Therefore the positive statement is as follows: *Homo, cum se sub aeternitatis specie contempletur, se aeternum esse scit*. The *scientia aeternitatis* is herewith also *essentia aeterna*. It is most remarkable that Spinoza again and again ascribes the eternity which he finds as idea in consciousness not to consciousness itself, but to Being. Throughout his system is manifest with reciprocal overthrow and destruction the conflict of Being and

Thought. The truth is that the being of persistence is not something external added to the notion of persistence, but, just as being is contained in consciousness, it dwells within the concept of persistence as its determination.

The explicit content of the third proof is that in Consciousness is contained all Being—that all that is is preserved in Thought and included in the Notion. As the Subject is preserved in Personality, so the Natural Individual is preserved in the Species, for in the Notion nothing is lost. Augustine says: “Si nulla essentia, in quantum essentia est, aliquid habet contrarium, multo minus habet contrarium prima illa essentia, quae dicitur veritas, in quantum essentia est. Primum autem verum est. Omnis essentia non ob aliud essentia est, nisi quia est. Esse autem non habet contrarium, nisi non esse: unde nihil est essentiae contrarium. Nullo modo igitur res ulla esse potest contraria illi substantiae, quae maxime ac primitus est.”—(Augustine, “De immort. animae,”¹ liber unus, c. 12.)

Relatively to the third proof there is still one observation to be made. It would be wonderful if it had not been urged against the triplicity of the proofs of immortality that the essential content of the third proof falls into the much-articulated sphere of the second proof. The essential basis of the second proof is that the soul, in its most specific determination, is stamped with the seal of immortality, or, in a word, is itself the embodied concept of immortality. Upon this concept also rests the third proof. In so far the two proofs agree; their difference lies in the fact that in the second proof the concept as concept is not explicit, but the capacity for infinite development is grasped as objective quality of the existent soul; or, again, reminiscence is apprehended as the inborn knowledge of an eternal past, and from this eternal past is inferred an endless future. The process here moves from past to future being; in other words, from the nature of being is deduced its future. In the third proof, on the contrary, the concept of per-

¹ Besides this book—which contains an entire series of proofs of immortality, although in fact they are all contained substantially in the above-discussed triplicity of proofs—should be mentioned the dialogue *De Quantitate animae*, as of importance in the history of the doctrine of immortality. It mentions seven grades or stations through which the soul is developed before it comes to God and dwells with him. The last station is the mansion of “*contemplatio Dei apud Deum*.” See also the writing of Augustine “*De spiritu et anima*.”

sistence is comprehended as Thought, and from this transition is made to the Being of persistence or to the actuality of the concept; the movement, therefore, is from subjective thought to its objective reality. A similar difference is found between the teleological and ontological proofs of the existence of God: the former finds God as subject in the objective world, in that from the reality of the object, apprehended as creation, it deduces the reality of the subject apprehended as Creator; the latter thinks God and moves from the thought to its actualization, from that which is necessary to Thought to that which necessarily exists. The outcome of this proof is the concept of Thought which includes Being, and does not have to seek it elsewhere. Thus, too, the first proof coincides with the third in that both rest upon unity: their difference lies in the fact that the immediate unity of the first proof is mediated in the third.

IMMORTALITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL.¹

BY W. T. HARRIS.

I. *Introduction.*

1. Our argument for immortality will be based chiefly on psychology. The proofs on which most men rely for their conviction that they will continue their individual existence after death we therefore pass over.

The proofs that we omit from our discussion are—

a. The return to life of those who have died—a resurrection in the body—notably the example which the Christian Church teaches as the basis of its faith and as the symbol of the resurrection of the individual man.

b. The physical manifestation of individuality after death by the exertion of power to control matter, or to materialize in temporary bodies as in cases of reported modern and ancient spiritualism.

¹ Read at the Concord School of Philosophy, August 1, 1884.

² As, for example, Tertullian, "De Anima," Cap. ix; 1 Sam. xxviii, 15.